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Resting-state neuroimaging is a dominant paradigm for studying brain function in
health and disease. It is attractive for clinical research because of its simplicity for
patients, straightforward standardization, and sensitivity to brain disorders. Importantly,
non-sensory experiences like mind wandering may arise from ongoing brain activity.
However, little is known about the link between ongoing brain activity and cognition, as
phenotypes of resting-state cognition—and tools to quantify them—have been lacking.
To facilitate rapid and structured measurements of resting-state cognition we developed a
50-item self-report survey, the Amsterdam Resting-State Questionnaire (ARSQ). Based on
ARSQ data from 813 participants assessed after 5min eyes-closed rest in their home, we
identified seven dimensions of resting-state cognition using factor analysis: Discontinuity
of Mind, Theory of Mind, Self, Planning, Sleepiness, Comfort, and Somatic Awareness.
Further, we showed that the structure of cognition was similar during resting-state fMRI
and EEG, and that the test-retest correlations were remarkably high for all dimensions.
To explore whether inter-individual variation of resting-state cognition is related to health
status, we correlated ARSQ-derived factor scores with psychometric scales measuring
depression, anxiety, and sleep quality. Mental health correlated positively with Comfort
and negatively with Discontinuity of Mind. Finally, we show that sleepiness may partially
explain a resting-state EEG profile previously associated with Alzheimer’s disease. These
findings indicate that the ARSQ readily provides information about cognitive phenotypes
and that it is a promising tool for research on the neural correlates of resting-state cognition
in health and disease.
Keywords: consciousness, EEG, introspection, mental health, mind wandering
INTRODUCTION
The growing use of resting-state neuroimaging has greatly
improved our knowledge of the spatiotemporal character of
ongoing brain activity in health and disease. The observation
of a highly active distributed set of brain regions during low-
demanding tasks—referred to as the default mode network—
has been particularly influential in the development of this
field (Raichle et al., 2001). Many other resting-state networks
(Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2009) and their interac-
tions (Fox and Raichle, 2007; Doucet et al., 2012) have since been
described. Also the complex temporal dynamics of ongoing activ-
ity has received a great deal of interest (Linkenkaer-Hansen et al.,
2001; He, 2011; Hardstone et al., 2012) with recent studies show-
ing that that intrinsic neuronal dynamics during rest can predict
individual variability in behavior (Palva et al., 2013; Smit et al.,
2013). Testing whether individual variation in ongoing brain
activity can also explain individual differences in non-sensory
experiences would require tools to quantify thoughts and feelings
based on introspection.
From a cognitive viewpoint, the resting state may be viewed
as a model system for states in which attention drifts away
from the task at hand towards inner mentation—also referred
to as stimulus-independent thought (Antrobus, 1968; Teasdale
et al., 1995), daydreaming, or mind wandering (Smallwood and
Schooler, 2006). It has been proposed that this mentation could
be linked to default mode network activity (Buckner et al., 2008)
and, indeed, there is empirical support for this idea (Mason
et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009; Hasenkamp et al., 2012). Still,
even though mind wandering has been associated with atten-
tion, episodic memory retrieval, prospection, and theory of mind
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Smallwood et al., 2013), remarkably
little progress has been made in terms of developing “the resting
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state” as a multi-faceted cognitive construct with standardized
tools to quantify it and, thereby, allowing to investigate its
neuronal origin.
Several studies have used resting-state neuroimaging to iden-
tify pathophysiological states in brain disorders (Linkenkaer-
Hansen et al., 2005; Stam et al., 2006; Greicius et al., 2007).
It remains unknown, however, whether patients and healthy
controls experienced the scanning session differently. If so, quan-
tifying patient-control differences in cognitive states could help
understand the functional significance of the observed physi-
ological changes. However, systematic group differences in the
elicited cognitive state could also lead to smaller differences in
resting-state brain activity than would have been observed if the
groups were balanced for their cognitive states. Furthermore, cog-
nitive states that are secondary to the clinical condition, such
as arousal or comfort (Ogedegbe et al., 2008), could bias the
dynamicmeasures derived from functional neuroimaging data. In
all of these situations, information about participants’ cognitive
state could potentially improve the interpretation or increase the
sensitivity and specificity of neuroimaging biomarkers in clinical
of pharmacological studies (Klumpers et al., 2012).
Here, we introduce the self-report Amsterdam Resting-State
Questionnaire (ARSQ), consisting of 50 statements on thoughts
and feelings that one may experience during rest. Based on a
large ARSQ data set obtained using the online platform of the
Netherlands Sleep Registry we developed a model of resting-
state cognition using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis
(EFA and CFA). A primary motivation behind the conception of
the ARSQ was to create an effective tool to be used in combi-
nation with neuroimaging. Therefore, we also tested the model
of resting-state cognition on ARSQ data gathered from studies
measuring resting-state functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG). In addition, we stud-
ied the relations between the different dimensions of resting-state
cognition and widely used measures of mental health, depression,
anxiety and sleep quality. Our findings suggest that resting-state
cognition is characterized by at least seven phenotypes, which we
labeled Discontinuity of Mind, Theory of Mind, Self, Planning,
Sleepiness, Comfort, and Somatic Awareness. Given the promi-
nence of mind wandering in daily life (Killingsworth and Gilbert,
2010) and its putative impairment in the form of excessive worry
and rumination in brain disorders (Mor and Winquist, 2002;
Aldao et al., 2010), an efficient and validated tool that quantifies
resting-state experience, such as the ARSQ, should be of inter-
est to a wide range of clinical and cognitive scientists and, in
particular, the resting-state neuroimaging community.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SELF-REPORT AMSTERDAM RESTING-STATE QUESTIONNAIRE (ARSQ)
Inspired by previous mind-wandering research (Buckner and
Carroll, 2007), mindfulness scales (Brown and Ryan, 2003) and
personality inventories (Costa and McRae, 1985), we initially
formulated more than 100 Likert-type statements relating to
thoughts and feelings that may be experienced during a resting
state. All statements were scored on a five-point ordinal scale with
the labels “Completely Disagree,” “Disagree,” “Neither Agree nor
Disagree,” “Agree,” and “Completely Agree.” Small-sample pilot
experiments helped identify statements that were ambiguous or
too specific (e.g., items that were always rated “strongly disagree”)
and participants were asked to suggest statements they felt were
lacking. Eventually, a subset of 45 statements was selected for the
ARSQ (Table 1 and an additional 5 items were selected to assess
response validity, bringing the total length of the ARSQ to 50
statements. A key aim during the questionnaire/scale develop-
ment was to minimize the impact of the fading memory of the
resting-state experience by keeping the questionnaire short: the
ARSQ is usually completed in less than 4min even when lying in
an fMRI scanner (226± 39 s SD). The item order of the ARSQ
was randomized in the fMRI and EEG groups.
PARTICIPANTS
We obtained ARSQ data from three different settings (see Table 2
for group-specific demographics). The largest data set (n = 1367,
908 females, age range 18–87) was obtained from the Dutch
version of the questionnaire as part of the online assessment bat-
tery of the Netherlands Sleep Registry (www.sleepregistry.org),
through which participants could complete the ARSQ at home.
TheNetherlands Sleep Registry (NSR) is a database aimed at sam-
pling multiple questionnaires in a large cohort comprising the
full range from very light to very sound sleepers. Approximately
77% of our participants were identified to not suffer from insom-
nia based on their score on the Insomnia Severity Index with a
cutoff of 14 (Morin et al., 2011), which is in line with reported
insomnia prevalence ratings of 9–27% in the general popula-
tion (Leblanc et al., 2009). In addition to the home setting, we
analyzed ARSQ data obtained from a sample of dizygotic twins
and their close relatives (n = 68, 43 females, age range 19–52)
after an eyes-closed resting-state fMRI experiment and while
still lying in the scanner. Finally, we analyzed data from a sam-
ple of university students (n = 89, 50 females, age range 18–55)
that partook in studies of resting-state EEG. The study protocols
presented here were approved by the institutional review board
of the VU University Medical Centre/Academic Medical Centre,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands. All participants provided written
informed consent prior to participation in the study.
ASSESSMENT OF RESTING-STATE COGNITION
Participants in the home setting were asked to enable and test
their PC audio equipment (i.e., turn on speakers or put on
headphones) and received the following instruction: “For this
experiment it is required that you are able to sit relaxed with
your eyes closed in a quiet and isolated environment during a
period of 5min.” Subsequently, participants could start the exper-
iment with the additional instruction: “Once the resting session
has ended you will be notified by a beep. You can stop the sound
by clicking ‘Stop.’ Afterwards you can click on ‘Next’ to proceed
to the questions. Should you be interrupted by something or
someone during the 5min rest, you may open your eyes, click
on the button ‘Stop’ and, subsequently, on the button ‘Restart’
to restart the resting session.” The task instruction immediately
preceding the start of the experiment was “The following part of
the test lasts 5min. Relax, try not to fall asleep, click ‘Next’ and
immediately close your eyes to start.” The task instruction imme-
diately after the 5min of eyes-closed rest was: “The 5min of rest is
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Table 1 | Endorsement rate of ARSQ items (n = 1367, complete data set).
ARSQ Item # −− − +/− + ++
“I thought about my feelings.” 24 27 21 24 5
“I felt restless.” 32 24 20 17 7
“I felt tired.” 28 25 20 20 7
“I felt sleepy.” 24 30 18 21 7
“I felt comfortable.” 3 12 20 51 15
“I felt relaxed.” 4 15 20 46 16
“I felt happy.” 6 15 42 29 7
“I felt ill.” (R) 72 18 7 3 1
“I enjoyed the session.” 14 22 36 22 6
“I had negative feelings.” (R) 45 31 14 9 1
“I felt bored.” 26 30 21 19 5
“I felt nothing.” 28 36 26 9 1
“I felt the same throughout the session.” 5 19 16 47 12
“I thought about my health.” 39 30 12 17 2
“I thought about my work/study.” 36 25 10 24 5
“I thought about my behavior.” 34 30 13 20 3
“I had thoughts that I would not readily share with others.” 53 32 7 5 2
“I had busy thoughts.” 28 30 18 17 7
“I had similar thoughts throughout the session.” 7 19 22 41 10
“I thought about others.” 17 25 18 34 5
“I thought about myself.” 9 12 19 51 8
“I thought about pleasant things.” 11 21 33 31 5
“I had my thoughts under control.”(R) 7 19 26 39 9
“I thought about solving problems.” 25 30 18 24 3
“I thought about the aim of the experiment.” 29 26 16 25 5
“I had difficulty staying awake.” 47 34 10 7 3
“I had rapidly switching thoughts.” 14 24 21 29 11
“I had superficial thoughts.” 8 24 25 38 4
“I thought about the past.” 35 36 12 14 3
“I thought about the present.” 10 10 18 51 11
“I thought about the future.” 22 26 19 29 5
“I had deep thoughts.” 27 39 21 11 2
“I thought about nothing.” 41 29 16 11 4
“I had difficulty holding on to my thoughts.” 18 30 24 24 4
“I thought about people I like.” 26 24 19 25 6
“I thought in images.” 22 20 16 32 10
“I thought in words.” 14 21 18 36 11
“I thought about things I need to do.” 19 22 16 32 11
“I was conscious of my body.” 8 13 15 48 16
“I thought about the sounds around me.” 14 23 18 36 10
“I thought about the odors around me.” 43 39 10 7 2
“I thought about my heartbeat.” 43 34 8 12 4
“I thought about my breathing.” 26 21 11 28 14
“ I felt pain.” (R) 54 25 7 12 3
“I placed myself in other peoples’ shoes.” 45 32 13 9 1
“I felt motivated to participate.”(V) 3 6 21 52 18
“I have difficulty remembering my thoughts.” (V) 33 39 15 11 1
“I have difficulty remembering my feelings.” (V) 34 42 13 10 2
“I had my eyes closed.” (V) 2 2 5 30 62
“I was able to rate the statements.” (V) 0 1 9 55 35
An (R) designates items that were reverse coded prior to analysis, (V) indicates those items that were used for validation. Ratings ranged from “Completely disagree”
(−−) to “Completely agree” (++) on a 5-point rating scale.
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Table 2 | Amsterdam Resting-State Questionnaire participant statistics, based on validated data set (n = 813).
Group Sample size Age
Total Females Mean (±SD)
NETHERLANDS SLEEP REGISTRY
Amsterdam Resting-State Questionnaire (ARSQ) 813 622 52.9 (14.2)
Pittsburg Sleep Quality Index (PSQI) 458* 352 53.7 (14.3)
Insomnia Severity Index (ISI) 458* 352 53.7 (14.3)
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 700* 523 53.0 (14.1)
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) 700* 523 53.0 (14.1)
Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology (IDS) 699* 523 53.3 (14.0)
Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (TEPS) 337* 258 54.9 (13.8)
RAND-36 699* 520 53.5 (13.9)
fMRI COHORT
Amsterdam Resting-State Questionnaire (ARSQ) 68 43 29.7 (8.8)
EEG COHORT
Amsterdam Resting-State Questionnaire (ARSQ) 89 50 21.7 (4.7)
*Number of participants who filled out both ARSQ (validated data set) and the respective scale.
over. Now several statements will follow regarding potential feel-
ings and thoughts you may have experienced during the resting
period. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each
statement.” In order to identify invalid trials, participants in the
NSR sample indicated at the end of the questionnaire whether the
eyes-closed rest session was interrupted or not, with the option
to give a detailed reason. The participants of the fMRI and EEG
experiments received identical task instructions for the resting
state, except that they were notified by the experimenter when
the 5min had passed. The fMRI participants used a button-box
to select their responses in an E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) adapted version of the ARSQ after the rest-
ing period and while still in the scanner. The EEG participants
were placed in a dimly lit room and a comfortable chair with
high-density (128-channel) EEG caps mounted and filled out a
computerized version of the ARSQ via mouse input. In all three
groups, the ARSQ was administered immediately following the
5min eyes-closed rest.
QUESTIONNAIRE DATA PREPARATION
Data were obtained from 1367 respondents and subsequently
conservatively screened based on the validation items of the
ARSQ to limit the potentially negative impact on rating accu-
racy introduced by inability to recall resting-state cognition or
reluctance to properly conform to the task-instructions. This was
done by (1) filtering out those who reported being interrupted
during the trial (n = 159), (2) those that did not feel moti-
vated to participate in the study (n = 112), (3) participants that
had difficulty remembering their thoughts (n = 170) or feelings
(n = 154), (4) removing participants that indicated not being
able to rate the statements (n = 135), (5) removing participants
scoring below “Agree” on the statements “I had my eyes closed”
(n = 118) and, finally, (6) removing participants scoring consis-
tently at the extremes of the scale (n = 2). The NSR participants
were encouraged to fill out additional psychometric scales, which
resulted in sample sizes ranging from 337–700 (Table 2). Finally,
the item “I had my thoughts under control” was reverse coded
prior to confirmatory factor analysis and computation of the
mean scores, such that all items correlate positively with a given
factor.
EEG RECORDINGS
Participants in the EEG setting were recruited from the stu-
dent population of the VU University Amsterdam as part of an
elective course. Measurements took place in our EEG labora-
tory. Resting-state recordings were performed using two Electrical
Geodesics (EGI, Eugene, OR) EEG systems (GES250 AC and
GES300 DC), using 128-EGI HydroCel channel sponge-base
EEG-caps. Impedances were kept below 75 kOhm (a suitable
threshold for these kinds of EEG-caps). Data were recorded at
1000Hz sampling rate, with a 400Hz low-pass (GES250) and
0.01Hz high-pass hardware filter and with 16 Bit resolution and
reference at Cz (vertex).
EEG ANALYSIS
The data were subsequently exported to MATLAB (The
Mathworks Inc., Natick, MA), down-sampled to 500Hz and
band-pass filtered between 1 and 45Hz using finite impulse
response (fir) filters. Data cleaning and artifact rejection was
done using the automated algorithms in the MATLAB tool-
boxes FASTER (Nolan et al., 2010) to detect and interpolate
bad channels and epochs and ADJUST (Mognon et al., 2011) to
remove eye movement and muscle artifacts using independent
component analysis. Signals were then re-referenced to common
average reference. Analyses and EEG biomarker extraction was
performed using EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig, 2004) and the
Neurophysiological Biomarker Toolbox (Hardstone et al., 2012,
www.nbtwiki.net). Here, we report on the analysis of 95th per-
centile theta-oscillation life-times as introduced by Montez et al.
(2009). Briefly, this biomarker is obtained for each channel by
band-pass filtering the signal between 4 and 7Hz using a fir filter,
extracting the amplitude envelope using the Hilbert transform,
introducing a threshold at the median of the amplitude enve-
lope, and identifying the start and end of an oscillation burst
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from the crossings of the amplitude envelope with that thresh-
old. The life-time of a burst is the time between crossings. Finally,
the cumulative probability distribution of oscillation life-times
is computed and the 95th percentile extracted as the biomarker
representing the tendency of oscillations to stay elevated in ampli-
tude for a sustained period of time in each channel. Correlation
between cognitive dimensions and biomarkers were based on
the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. We did not
apply a correction for multiple comparisons, because the num-
ber of channels with p-values below 0.05 was 13 (Figure 7) and
the probability of this many or more false positives is only 1% (cf.
binomial distribution, Montez et al., 2009).
RESULTS
SEVEN DIMENSIONS OF RESTING-STATE COGNITION
Raw ARSQ response data (n = 1367) were screened based on the
five validation items of the ARSQ (see Materials and Methods),
resulting in a reference data set (n = 813). In order to make a pre-
liminary assessment whether the data could be partitioned into
meaningful clusters, we performed an exploratory factor analy-
sis (EFA) with oblique rotation on the reference data set with 45
ARSQ statements (excluding the five used for validation) extract-
ing seven factors (data not shown), which represented the data
well [χ2 (696, N = 813) = 2687.15, Root Mean Square Error
of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.059]. In an additional cross-
validation step, we recalculated the EFA based on half the refer-
ence data set (n = 400) and obtained similar fit indices [χ2 (696,
N = 400) = 1633.89, RMSEA = 0.058].
These results suggested that our data were suitable for fitting
more advanced models and we proceeded with a confirmatory
factor analysis (Digman, 1997; Hoekstra et al., 2011; Tully et al.,
2011). A number of items (n = 18, Table 3) were excluded from
the model, as these could either not be used to form interpretable
factors with at least three items (the minimum requirement for
indicators in a latent variable model), or did not improve reliabil-
ity estimates of selected factor items, often due to strong skew in
the responses (e.g., “I felt ill”).
We therefore restricted our selection of items for the model
to 27 out of the 45 ARSQ items (Table 3) and created seven fac-
tors of resting-state cognition. The resulting model (Figure 1,
unit variance identification, zero mean for the latent variables
and unit loading identification) fit the data adequately: χ2(303,
N = 813) = 2455.63, RMSEA = 0.093, Comparative Fit Index
(CFI) = 0.88. In line with previous studies, we accepted RMSEA
fit statistics below 0.1 (Steiger, 1989; Hutchinson and Olmos,
1998) but relaxed the common requirement of having a CFI >
0.95 (Schreiber et al., 2006) to CFI > 0.85, because the CFI is
sensitive to correlations among indicators (items) and both the
categorical nature and skewness in some items may have con-
tributed to lower observed correlations, attenuating the CFI.
Based on the content of the items used in the model, we
labeled the seven factors: Discontinuity of Mind, Theory of Mind,
Self, Planning, Sleepiness, Comfort, and Somatic Awareness
(Figure 2). Reliability (Cronbach’s α) of the selected items proved
well-above 0.75 for most factors (see Table 3), except for “Self”
and “Somatic Awareness,” where correlation among the items was
lower. However, the assumed construct underlying as reflected
by the statements led us to expect that these factors were nev-
ertheless important to retain, i.e., “I thought about myself,” “I
thought about my feelings” and “I thought my behavior” may all
be sensibly grouped under the factor “Self.”
We further tested the robustness of the model by (1) re-
computing the fit statistics for half the reference set (n = 400,
different cases from EFA validation step) and (2) randomly draw-
ing a subset (n = 400) from the reference set for a large number
of iterations (k = 1000) to estimate the range of fit statistics that
can be observed. The results are summarized in Table 4 and show
that the split-half sample and the random samples on average
fall within these limits, suggesting that the reported model fit is
robust within our data set.
In addition, inclusion of the sample of cases previously
removed during the screening stage based on the validation items
of the ARSQ, left the model fit unaffected [χ2(303, N = 1112) =
3360.13, RMSEA = 0.095, CFI = 0.88] suggesting that there was
no strong bias from the exclusion of this sample. Similarly, to
ensure that the inclusion of participants with a potential sleep
disorder did not bias the model of resting-state cognition, we
recomputed the CFA excluding all participants scoring in the
moderate to clinical range (n = 107) of the Insomnia Severity
Index (ISI < 15) and observed that the model was still valid
[χ2(303, N = 351) = 1179.01, RMSEA = 0.091, CFI = 0.87].
Finally, even though a detailed analysis of the particular items
that were involved with low rating ability was not possible, we
nevertheless tested (independent t-test, Bonferroni correction)
for mean differences in ARSQ responses between the reference
set (n = 813) and the set of cases removed for low rating abil-
ity (n = 135). These results suggest that the excluded subsample
experienced significantly lower comfort and Somatic Awareness,
but increased Discontinuity of Mind and Sleepiness (Table 5).
Interestingly, at the single-item level the top-5 most significant
differences were observed for the five validation items. This sug-
gests that some participants were unable to rate the statements
because of having lost their memory of thoughts or feelings, or
lacking motivation to participate.
In order to simplify future analyses based on the 7-factor
model we calculated the mean scores from the ARSQ responses,
by averaging the item scores within a factor. These mean scores
were strongly correlated with the estimated model factor scores
(Table 6) and, therefore, we deemed it acceptable to adopted the
more convenient mean scores for all further analyses.
STABILITY AND VARIABILITY OF RESTING-STATE COGNITION
The NSR group of participants provided insight into resting-state
cognition within a natural and familiar environment. An impor-
tant motivation behind the development of the ARSQ, however,
was to create an effective tool to be used in combination with
neuroimaging. Therefore, we also gathered ARSQ data in studies
measuring resting-state fMRI (n = 68) and EEG (n = 89).
In a first step, we formally assessed (Lubke and Muthén, 2005)
the relationships among the factors between the three groups
(Figures 3A–C), which showed that the correlation structure was
equivalent across groups [χ2(42) = 46.49, p = 0.30], but this was
not the case for the covariance structure [χ2
(56) = 74.87, p =
0.05]. As the main difference appeared to stem from the factor
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FIGURE 1 | Path diagram of the specified resting-state cognition model
tested in CFA. Paths between factors (ovals) represent factorial correlations.
Numbers within squares indicate the standardized loadings of the particular
item on its factor and residuals are depicted by the short single-headed
arrows pointing towards items.
Comfort, we freed this parameter in a subsequent retesting, which
indeed resulted in equal covariance structure across the groups
[χ2
(55) = 60.17, p = 0.29]. Next, we tested for mean differences
(one-way ANOVA, Bonferroni corrected) between the groups on
the mean scores of the seven dimensions and found significant
effects for five on them: Discontinuity of Mind: χ2
(2) = 34.63,
p < 0.01, Theory of Mind: χ2(2) = 16.49, p < 0.01, Self χ2(2) =
19.17, p < 0.01, Planning: χ2
(2) = 36.0, p < 0.01 and Sleepiness:
χ2(2) = 10.96, p < 0.05 (see Figure 4A).
It may be argued that the minimal instructions involved with
assuming a resting state may be so unconstrained as to lead to
highly variable and ultimately unpredictable responses on mea-
sures of resting state cognition. To address this issue of variability
we calculated retest correlations of the ARSQ factors in the fMRI
group through a second resting-state examination 45min after
the first block (participants engaged in various cognitive tasks in
between). All seven dimensions exhibited remarkably high retest
correlations across resting-state blocks (Figure 3D, diagonal and
Figure 5) in the range of 0.52–0.70 and corresponding effect sizes
(Cohen, 1992) ranging from a medium 27% (e.g., Comfort) to a
high level 49% of explained variance (e.g., Somatic Awareness).
Although not factors per se, the individual items “I thought in
words” and “I thought in images” reveal interesting re-test pat-
terns as well, with a very high correlation (r = 0.73, p < 0.001)
for the former item. In addition, the first resting-state session
was not statistically different from the second session in terms
of correlation [χ2(21) = 22.23, p = 0.39] or covariance [χ2(28) =
33.59, p = 0.22] structure. Over the two resting-state sessions,
only Comfort showed a significant decrease in mean factor score
(Figure 4B).
To further explore the sources of variability we computed the
sums of squares from a repeated measures ANOVA for all seven
FIGURE 2 | The Amsterdam Resting-State Questionnaire reveals seven
dimensions of resting-state cognition. The factor analysis of the
variance-covariance structure of the data from the self-report ARSQ
(n = 813) resulted in seven factors, which we labeled as shown in the green
boxes. A total of 27 items were included in the final model and the individual
items belonging to each factor are listed to the right (the CFA path diagram is
shown in Figure 1).
factors in order to assess the amount of variance between and
within subjects over the two resting-state blocks (Table 7). Most
of the variability over the two resting-state blocks stems from dif-
ferences between individuals, whereas the remainder is almost
completely attributable to within-subject variability—the vari-
ance contribution of the resting-state blocks is limited. However,
participants engaged in several cognitive tasks in between resting-
state blocks, demanding a cognitive switch frommind wandering
to task engagement. It is therefore interesting that participants
largely returned to the previous mode of resting-state process-
ing, suggesting a trait-like quality of resting-state cognition. These
results indicate that besides the stability in structure, resting-state
cognition within individuals appears to reflect stable subject
characteristics associated with traits or health status.
ARSQ CORRELATESWITH ESTABLISHED PSYCHOMETRIC SCALES
To explore the association of resting-state cognition with men-
tal health, we correlated the ARSQ-derived scores with scores
on established psychometric scales (Figure 6A). We observed
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Table 4 | Averaged fit statistics of (k = 1000) randomly selected sets of cases (n = 400) for 7-factor resting-state cognition model compared to
a split-half validation sample not used for EFA (n = 400).
Sample Chi-Square test Mean ± SD
[min max]
RMSEA Mean ± SD
[min max]
RMSEA 90% C.I.
[min max]
CFI Mean ± SD
[min max]
Random 1306.90 ± 82.73
[1045.25 1561.26]
0.091 ± 0.004
[0.078 0.10]
0.86 ± 0.004 0.96 ± 0.004
[0.073 0.11]
0.88 ± 0.01
[0.84 0.91]
Split-half 1320.06 0.092 [0.087 0.097] 0.86
RMSEA, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; CFI, comparative fit index. Degrees of freedom = 303.
Table 5 | Participants excluded for indicating inability to rate the ARSQ primarily differ on items that are used for validation (V) and those
related to Discontinuity of Mind, Sleepiness and Somatic Awareness.
Reference sample1 Excluded sample2 T -statistic
Mean ± SD Mean ± SD (df = 946)
ITEMS*
I was able to rate the statements (V) 3.4 ± 0.5 2.8 ± 0.5 35.16
I have difficulty remembering my thoughts (V) 1.7 ± 0.7 2.8 ± 1.2 −13.89
I have difficulty remembering my feelings (V) 1.7 ± 0.7 2.6 ± 1.2 −12.81
I had my eyes closed (V) 4.7 ± 0.5 4.1 ± 1.1 11.37
I felt motivated to participate (V) 4.0 ± 0.6 3.5 ± 0.9 7.66
I felt happy 3.3 ± 0.9 2.6 ± 1.0 7.31
I felt comfortable 3.8 ± 0.9 3.2 ± 1.1 6.74
I had difficulty holding on to my thoughts 2.5 ± 1.1 3.1 ± 1.1 −6.56
I had my thoughts under control 3.4 ± 1.0 2.8 ± 1.1 6.26
I felt restless 2.2 ± 1.2 2.9 ± 1.2 −6.04
I felt bored 2.3 ± 1.1 2.9 ± 1.2 −5.95
I felt relaxed 3.7 ± 1.0 3.1 ± 1.1 5.81
I enjoyed the session 3.0 ± 1.1 2.4 ± 1.1 5.57
I thought about pleasant things 3.1 ± 1.0 2.6 ± 1.0 5.48
I had negative feelings 1.8 ± 1.0 2.3 ± 1.1 −5.36
I felt tired 2.4 ± 1.2 3.0 ± 1.3 −5.08
I was conscious of my body 3.6 ± 1.1 3.2 ± 1.2 4.47
I felt ill 1.4 ± 0.7 1.7 ± 1.0 −4.31
I felt the same throughout the session 3.5 ± 1.1 3.1 ± 1.2 4.26
I had busy thoughts 2.3 ± 1.2 2.8 ± 1.0 −3.94
I felt sleepy 2.4 ± 1.2 2.8 ± 1.3 −3.87
FACTORS**
Somatic awareness 3.6± 0.8 3.0 ± 0.9 7.7
Discontinuity of mind 2.5± 0.8 3.0 ± 0.9 –6.98
Sleepiness 2.2± 1.0 2.6 ± 1.1 –4.64
1Sample with cases removed based on response on Validation items (n = 813), 2Sample of cases removed based on scoring < 3.0 on “I was able to rate the
statements” (n = 135). Bonferroni adjustments: *αadjusted = 0.001, **αadjusted = 0.007. Only significant mean differences shown.
significant correlations between ARSQ factors and self-report
scores of anxiety (Hospital Anxiety andDepression Scale, subscale
Anxiety) (Spinhoven et al., 1997), depression (HADS subscale
depression, Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale,
and Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology) (Radloff, 1977;
Rush et al., 1986) and sleep-wake variables (Pittsburgh Sleep
Quality Index, and Insomnia Severity Index) (Buysse et al., 1989;
Bastien et al., 2001). In particular, Discontinuity of Mind and
Comfort exhibited strong associations with indicators of men-
tal health problems. These relationships were further validated
by the opposite pattern that emerged when correlated to the
Research and Development-36 (Van Der Zee et al., 1996) sub-
scale measuring mental health: high scores of mental wellbeing
were accompanied by high scores on Comfort and low scores on
Discontinuity of Mind (Figures 6B,C). Interestingly, we note that
the TEPS (temporal experience of pleasure scale) (Gard et al.,
2006) subscale of “anticipatory pleasure” only correlated with Self
and Planning, which are the cognitive components one would
expect to be primarily involved in the anticipation of pleasant
stimuli.
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Table 6 | Descriptive statistics of correlations between mean scores
and estimated model factor scores.
Factor r CI95% t(811) p
Discontinuity of mind 0.95 [0.94 0.95] 82.3 <0.001
Theory of mind 0.98 [0.98 0.99] 155.9 <0.001
Self 0.88 [0.86 0.89] 52.5 <0.001
Planning 0.96 [0.95 0.96] 92.8 <0.001
Sleepiness 0.96 [0.96 0.97] 104.8 <0.001
Comfort 0.94 [0.94 0.95] 84.0 <0.001
Somatic awareness 0.66 [0.62 0.69] 24.8 <0.001
Pearson correlation between estimated factor score derived from CFA model
and mean scores, 95th percentile confidence interval of correlation, Student’s
t-statistic assessing the significance of the correlation (degrees of freedom).
Estimated model factor scores are normally distributed and continuous, whereas
mean scores are formed by adding responses of items within a factor and
dividing by their number, thus yielding discrete responses on the original item
scale.
SLEEPINESS CORRELATESWITH CLINICALLY RELEVANT EEG
BIOMARKERS
A commonly noted phenomenon in clinical neurophysiology
is the slowing of resting-state electroencephalographic or
magneto-encephalographic activity in neurological disease
(Grunwald et al., 2002; Stoffers et al., 2007; Montez et al.,
2009). It is also well-known that states of drowsiness are
related to increased activity in lower frequency bands, e.g., in
the 4–7Hz theta range (Strijkstra et al., 2003). We therefore
tested the relationship between the ARSQ factor of Sleepiness
and theta-band activity (Figures 7A–C, see Materials and
Methods) and observed a prominent positive correlation was
observed for the 95th percentile theta-burst life-time (Montez
et al., 2009). These findings suggest that the Sleepiness score
may be used to discover potential confounders or serve as
a covariate in those cases where low levels of vigilance may
potentially interfere with the interpretation of the results. In
addition, these results seem to suggest that even normal indi-
viduals may exhibit patterns of brain activity similar to those
of patients with neurological impairments (e.g., Alzheimer’s
disease), simply due to the mediating role of lowered arousal.
A detailed description of associations between the seven
ARSQ dimensions of resting-state cognition and neuroimaging
biomarkers from EEG and fMRI will be provided in future
publications.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we investigated resting-state cognition expe-
rienced during 5min of eyes-closed rest by means of the ARSQ.
Using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, we derived
seven dimensions: Discontinuity of Mind, Theory of Mind,
Self, Planning, Sleepiness, Comfort, and Somatic Awareness. All
dimensions showed large inter-individual variation, high retest
correlation, and highly similar interdependencies across three
experimental settings. Importantly, resting-state cognition was
shown to correlate with mental health and EEG biomarkers.
Together, these findings suggest that the function of resting-state
FIGURE 3 | Resting-state cognition has a similar structure in different
experimental settings and shows high test-retest correlation.
(A) Lower triangular Pearson correlation matrix of resting-state cognition
factors derived from the NSR participants in their home environment.
(B) The same correlation matrix derived for subjects filling in the ARSQ
immediately after a resting-state fMRI experiment (1st block) and while
still lying in the scanner. (C) Data from participants in EEG studies
reveal a similar pattern of inter-factor correlations to that in (A) and (B).
(D) The correlation of the factor scores between the first and second
resting-state block of the fMRI sample shows strong retest correlations
(diagonal).
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Factor score averages (±SD) show that there may be
substantial variability in resting-state cognition across the three groups
(Home, fMRI, and EEG, t-test corrected for family relationships). (B) Only
Comfort decreases significantly over two resting-state fMRI blocks separated
by 45min (t-test with family dependency and Bonferroni correction, ±SD).
brain activity in both fundamental and clinical settings can be
further elucidated by taking into account resting-state cognition,
which is quickly, reliably and informatively quantified by the
ARSQ.
Several of the relationships among the ARSQ factors are con-
sistent with previous research. The observed positive correlation
between Sleepiness and Discontinuity of Mind is in line with the
loss of coherent thought as one enters a state of drowsiness (Yang
et al., 2010). Further, the strong anti-correlation of Comfort and
Discontinuity of Mind is interesting, because the items belong-
ing to these factors are qualitatively very different. Discontinuity
of Mind is mostly concerned with a subjective sense of control
over one’s thoughts, whereas Comfort clearly focuses on phys-
ical and mental well-being. The present data cannot rule out
the possibility that the perception of Discontinuity of Mind is
also experienced as uncomfortable; however, we speculate that
feeling less comfortable may interfere with the flow of thoughts
and cause the perception of discontinuity. Furthermore, when
subjects had their resting-state cognition sampled the second
time—having spent 45min in the MRI scanner—their Comfort
decreased while Discontinuity of Mind showed an increase
FIGURE 5 | Cognition over two resting-state sessions was strongly and
positively correlated, yet displayed substantial between-subject
variation. As such, variation in resting-state cognition is primarily due to
inter-individual differences. Note: to aid visualization, a minute amount of
white noise (M = 0.1± 0.05 SD) was added to the data points.
Table 7 | Variance decomposition of resting-state cognition in fMRI
group (n = 68).
Sum of squares (%)
Factor Between Resting-state Residual Total
individuals block (within) (within)
Discontinuity of
mind
62.1 (78.4) 1.4 (1.8) 15.7 (19.8) 79.3 (100)
Theory of mind 106.8 (75.7) 0.1 (0.1) 34.0 (24.2) 140.9 (100)
Self 71.3 (78.2) 0.00 (0) 19.9 (21.8) 91.2 (100)
Planning 74.5 (84.2) 0.03 (0.0) 14.0 (15.8) 88.5 (100)
Sleepiness 90.4 (75.5) 0.8 (0.7) 28.5 (23.8) 119.7 (100)
Somatic
awareness
73.0 (83.4) 1.4 (1.6) 13.1 (15.0) 87.6 (100)
Comfort 122.5 (76.8) 4.1 (2.6) 32.9 (20.6) 159.6 (100)
Most of the variance in the scores over the two resting-state blocks is due to
between-subject variability. Repeated-measures ANOVA sum of squares con-
tribution of inter-individual and intra-individual variability for each resting-state
cognition factor mean score. Variance is divided into between-subjects variabil-
ity and within-subject variability, with the latter subdivided into the effect of the
resting-state block and residual variability. Percentages are fractions of total sum
of squares.
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FIGURE 6 | Factors of resting-state cognition strongly correlate with
classical measures of general mental well-being. (A) Correlation
heat map between the seven ARSQ-derived factors of resting-state
cognition and nine established psychometric scales of mental well-being
(Pearson correlation coefficients). Note the strong and opposite
correlations between the factors Discontinuity of Mind and Comfort and
the classical scales. (B) The correlation pattern of Comfort and (C)
Discontinuity of Mind reverses for the RAND36 subscale of mental
well-being, where high scores should be interpreted as a good mental
health. Abbreviations: PSQI, Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (Buysse
et al., 1989); ISI, Insomnia Severity Index (Bastien et al., 2001); HADS,
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Spinhoven et al., 1997); CESD,
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977); IDS,
Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology (Rush et al., 1986); TEPS,
Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale-Anticipatory (AP)/Consummatory
Pleasure (CP) (Gard et al., 2006); RAND36, Research And Development
36 (Van Der Zee et al., 1996).
(p = 0.02, uncorrected). In other words, if there is distracting
bodily discomfort, the continuity of thought may be perceived to
be low.
In the absence of goal-directed behavior, most cognition
during rest will qualify as mind wandering. Interestingly, the
propensity to mind wander has recently been associated with an
elevated experience of unhappiness (Killingsworth and Gilbert,
2010). In our data, however, we note the high scores of Comfort
in all three environments (Figure 4), suggesting that it is not
FIGURE 7 | Sleepiness correlates positively with sustained theta
activity. The theta oscillation life-time biomarker shows a central
topography (A), and correlates positively (significant electrodes in white
open circles) with the Sleepiness score of the ARSQ in medial fronto-central
scalp regions (B,C).
the process of mind wandering per se that is associated with
negative feelings. The negative association of Comfort with
sleep complaints as measured by the PSQI and ISI is consis-
tent with previous reports on a diminished capability to rec-
ognize comfort in insomnia, which may be related to reduced
gray matter volume in the orbitofrontal cortical area that is
critical to hedonic evaluation (Kringelbach, 2005; Raymann
and Van Someren, 2008; Altena et al., 2010; Stoffers et al.,
2012).
The pattern of correlations between the seven dimensions
of resting-state cognition assessed by the ARSQ was very sim-
ilar between the home, EEG, and fMRI settings. In particular,
the correlation pattern of Discontinuity of Mind, Theory of
Mind, Self, and Planning stayed remarkably stable across differ-
ent experimental settings. This suggests that mind wandering—a
common phenomenon during no or low-demanding externally
imposed tasks (Mason et al., 2007; Schooler et al., 2011)—
may be rooted in a closely integrated functional system in the
brain, which nevertheless shows large inter-individual variation.
It has been debated whether the resting state is a well-defined
task (Morcom and Fletcher, 2007) or, as some researchers have
suggested, a “no task” condition (Stam et al., 2006). Our data
strongly suggest that people do indeed perform a multitude
of cognitive tasks during the resting state, but that resting-
state cognition may exhibit stable, trait-like characteristics, as
reflected in the high retest correlation between subsequent fMRI
resting-state scans (Figure 5). We speculate that resting-state cog-
nition is analogous to spectral biomarkers of resting-state EEG
oscillations, which on the one hand are highly heritable traits
(Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2007) and, nevertheless, highly sen-
sitive state-changes, such as the progression from wakefulness to
sleep. More studies are needed to disentangle state and trait-like
properties of resting-state cognition, e.g., by testing the reliabil-
ity over longer time spans or slight changes in resting-state task
instructions.
The significant associations between many dimensions
of resting-state cognition and mental-health related scores
obtained with well-established psychometric instruments raise
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 446 | 12
Diaz et al. The Amsterdam Resting-State Questionnaire
interesting perspectives for clinical research. It allows for research
into differences in resting-state cognition between patients and
healthy controls and whether these can in turn be related to
neuroimaging biomarkers, which are often based on resting-
state measurements (Greicius, 2008). In this regard, we note the
cost efficiency of recording and analyzing ARSQ scores in clin-
ical cohorts, which could pave the way for hypothesis-driven
resting-state neuroimaging experiments.
Although research into cognitive constructs and mind percep-
tion has yielded fascinating insights (Gray et al., 2007), psycho-
metric instruments aimed at specifically exploring resting-state
cognition in neuroimaging are virtually non-existent. To our
knowledge, the Resting-State Questionnaire (ReSQ) developed
by Delamillieure et al. (2010) is the only other instrument that
has been constructed thus far (Delamillieure et al., 2010). The
ReSQ and the ARSQ, however, differ substantially from each
other. The ReSQ is a semi-structured, supervised and decision-
tree based questionnaire focused on visual imagery and inner
language/speech–but it should be noted that the ARSQ con-
tains items that assess these specific qualities as well (Figure 5).
We considered it important to sample multiple dimensions of
resting-state cognition in a standardized self-report fashion and
self-assessments have the advantage of reducing the risk of dete-
riorating the recollection of resting-state cognition by inter-
ference of the experimenter or by delayed onset of sampling
(Jonides et al., 2008). Finally, the short completion time of
the full ARSQ (on average less than 4min) adds much to its
usefulness in expensive and time-constrained neuroimaging set-
tings.
To conclude, the ARSQ allows for efficient, standardized
assessment of resting-state cognition during the classical eyes-
closed resting-state experiment and offers insights into the
content of cognition in various contexts and holding predictive
value with regard to established clinical instruments. We con-
jecture that in health and disease, quantification of resting-state
cognition will prove invaluable for addressing possible confounds
and will aid optimal interpretation of physiological data acquired
with resting-state neuroimaging.
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